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Spurred Emulation: The EU and
Regional Integration in Mercosur
and SADC
TOBIAS LENZ
This article analyses the EU’s influence on regional institutional change in Mercosur and
the Southern African Development Community from a diffusion perspective. Focusing on
market-building objectives and dispute settlement mechanisms, it addresses the puzzle
that policy-makers in both regions have, over time, increasingly adopted EU-style
institutional arrangements even though alternative institutional models more suitable to
their preferences for ‘pragmatic’, sovereignty-preserving cooperation have been available
at various critical junctures of institutional evolution. The article makes two main
arguments. First, it suggests that EU influence has affected outcomes in several specific
ways that are irreducible to, and quite different from, mainstream functional accounts of
economic regionalism. Second, it contends that the diffusion of EU institutional
templates can be understood as a process of spurred emulation, when regional policy-
makers emulate EU institutional models under conditions of uncertainty and promoted
by EU-oriented domestic actors as well as the EU’s direct involvement in the process.
The latest wave of regionalism – understood as the state-driven integration
of national economies – in Southern Africa and South America has
witnessed an enormous institutional evolution from its inception until
today. While it began with gradual and selective regional cooperation
(rather than across-the-board market integration) based on weak and purely
intergovernmental institutions in the 1980s, member states in the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and Mercosur are now pursuing
ambitious market integration objectives flanked by supranational courts –
both of which are (emerging) copies of EC/EU models.1 While policy-
makers deliberately rejected EU-style integration initially (see Campbell
et al. 1999; Lee 2003: 47), they are increasingly adopting EU-style formal
institutions in more recent periods. This is puzzling because alternative
institutional models – e.g. North American Free Trade Agreement
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(NAFTA) and World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement
procedure – that appear more suitable to policy-makers’ original preferences
for ‘pragmatic’ cooperation based on weak and sovereignty-preserving
institutions have been available at various critical junctures of institutional
evolution (Alter 2012). How can we account for successive waves of formal
institutional change at the regional level?
Functional theories of institutional change might attribute this evolution
to shifts in (powerful) member states’ preferences induced by altered
structural conditions. In this view, patterns of economic interdependence
determine the ambition and form of market liberalisation commitments,
while regional institutions and especially dispute settlement mechanisms
(DSMs) are designed accordingly to ensure their credibility (see Mattli 1999;
Moravcsik 1998; Smith 2000). In this article, I build upon but depart in
important ways from such mainstream functional explanations with their
rather deterministic conceptualisation of the relationship between functional
pressures and institutional change, drawing attention to the indeterminacy
of functional pressures and their interaction with diffusion dynamics
associated with the EU. I make two main arguments. First, I suggest that
EU influence is most likely to matter at those moments in time when there is
a strong functional demand for institutional change. However, functional
pressures are generally compatible with different viable institutional
arrangements; hence, policy-makers face the question of institutional
choice. I therefore contend, second, that EU influence affects these choices
in that EU-oriented domestic actors and the EU’s active material support
induce policy-makers to emulate EU-type institutional models under
conditions of uncertainty – a dynamic process I term ‘spurred emulation’.
Such influence has, however, not led to a wholesale copying of EU
institutional arrangements, but EU templates have regularly been adapted
to fit with policy-makers’ normative convictions, especially their continuing
concerns about national sovereignty.
These arguments build upon a growing body of work that has started to
document and explain EU influence on regional integration efforts in other
parts of the world through processes of learning, emulation and persuasion
(see Alter 2008; Duina 2010; de Lombaerde and Schulz 2009; Yeo 2008).
While these studies have largely looked at individual instances of EU
influence or have approached the topic as a series of instances based on a
‘snapshot picture’ of time (Pierson 2004), this article seeks to highlight the
dynamic and often cumulative effects of EU influence across time and their
interaction with functional dynamics. The article proceeds in three parts.
The first part sets the diffusion concept in the context of the literature on
comparative regionalism and discusses its scope conditions and mechan-
isms. The next two parts then trace the gradual diffusion of EC
market-building objectives and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)








































Comparative Regionalism and Diffusion from the EU: Conceptual Framework
The mainstream literature on global regionalism has focused almost
exclusively on domestic factors to account for its dynamics and outcomes,
and has a strongly functional flavour. It depicts the proliferation and shape
of regionalism since the early 1990s as the result of member states’ rational
responses to changing structural circumstances in the world economy,
conditioned by domestic constellations of power, interests and institutions.
The diffusion concept has the potential added value to address head-on the
impact of external influences on regionalism, while not presupposing an
asymmetric/hierarchical or even direct relationship between two identifiable
actors, as much of the Europeanisation literature does (Börzel and Risse
2012). It thereby shifts analytical attention from the influence-wielder to
the receiving end of external influence (see Jetschke and Lenz 2011). In the
current context, this implies understanding how especially powerful member
state governments were increasingly willing to endorse EU-style institutional
change through a process of spurred emulation. In the remainder of this
section, I discuss scope conditions and mechanisms drawing on the
theoretical framework outlined in the introduction (Börzel and Risse 2012).
Scope Conditions
Under what conditions can we expect the gradual diffusion of EU
institutional models to affect regional institutional change elsewhere? I
suggest that a functional demand is necessary for change to happen, while
EU influence then is conditioned mainly by domestic politics and power
asymmetries between both sides. Regarding the first point, EU-style
institutional change is highly unlikely in the absence of facilitating structural
conditions. Changes in external structural conditions need to combine with
a major political or economic crisis that throws previous established
practices into discredit and leads to institutional negotiations under
conditions of high uncertainty in order to unsettle entrenched member
state preferences, originally opposed to EU-style regional integration, and
the power configurations sustaining an existing regional institutional
equilibrium (Widmaier et al. 2007; see also Jetschke and Murray 2012).
Such situations create a demand for institutional change by revealing a
fundamental mismatch between existing institutional arrangements and
functional needs. However, functional pressures for change are generally
compatible with various institutional arrangements that are not easily
distinguishable in terms of effectiveness and sometimes even in their
distributional consequences (see Garrett and Weingast 1993). They thereby
provide policy-makers with a situation of institutional choice and open a
‘window of opportunity’ for the diffusion of EU models.
Even then, the diffusion of EU models is not ‘automatic’, but requires its
active promotion by various actors in the political process, thus being






































strongly conditioned by domestic politics. For one thing, many advocacy
groups and epistemic communities actively spur EU-type institutional
change, often supported by EU funding (Jetschke and Murray 2012). The
existence of the EU, with its widely perceived success, gives their claims a
priori legitimacy especially in regions like Mercosur and SADC, where
policy-makers share ‘the cultural understanding that [their] social entities
belong to a common social category’ with the EU in the sense that they are
all engaged in broader processes of Community-building rather than mere
trade liberalisation (Strang and Meyer 1993: 490). In short, it empowers
them vis-à-vis more powerful actors that might be opposed to such change.
The extent to which they successfully advance their demands with (powerful
member state) governments depends on the particularities of the domestic
political process such as their ability to access policy-makers, which to some
extent depends on regime type and state capacity.2 However, at a more
general level, we should expect the diffusion of EU-style institutional
arrangements ceteris paribus to be more likely than potential alternatives to
the extent that they are more actively spurred.
Moreover, spurring processes from below are often reinforced through EU
financial and technical assistance to region-building processes across the
world, with EU-style institutional arrangements receiving more material
support than potential alternatives. To the extent that regional organisations
depend heavily on outside funding, and are unable to compensate potential
loss of EU assistance from other sources, this material support forms an
important form of leverage that has a significant influence on regional
dynamics (see below). Given SADC’s greater material dependence on the EU
than Mercosur, we would expect EU influence ceteris paribus to be more
important there than in the Southern Cone (degree of power asymmetry).
Mechanisms
The various mechanisms are not mutually exclusive (Börzel and Risse 2012).
In fact, I suggest that the distinction between direct and indirect diffusion
mechanisms often blurs in practice, as active EU support and local
emulation interact in complex ways to produce particular outcomes. So how
are we to understand them in the current context? The EU’s material
support changes policy-makers’ incentives for action, under the conditions
mentioned before, but its provision is never conditional upon the adoption
of EU-type regional institutions. Hence, the effects of direct EU support on
processes of regional institutional change tend to be of a more diffuse nature
in terms of institutional choice, affecting mainly the timing of institutional
action, i.e. condition the demand side of institutional change. Attempts at
socialisation and persuasion by EU actors do occur informally, as interviews
revealed, but are less likely to affect the broad institutional picture that this
article focuses on. Regional institutional change is thus driven primarily by







































The first one – competition – is less useful in understanding EU-centred
diffusion processes. It suggests that different institutional arrangements are
readily distinguishable in terms of their effectiveness in reaching the
developmental objectives policy-makers pursue through regional integra-
tion, i.e. that they are able to undeniably identify ‘best practices’. Yet has the
EU been more effective or efficient than NAFTA in spurring economic
growth through the integration of national economies? The answer is far
from obvious.
This does not, however, preclude that actors seek to draw lessons from
different institutional arrangements in order to learn about underlying
cause–effect relationships in view of their own specific conditions. As the
editors rightly note, the question then is how we can distinguish empirically
between this mechanism and normative emulation, especially given that the
‘EU model’ is widely regarded as successful and has been theorised in
abstract and seemingly universally applicable categories – and is hence easily
justified as a rational choice (Strang and Meyer 1993). Drawing this
distinction will therefore always remain difficult empirically, but I never-
theless maintain that they each suggest distinct implications, which are, at
least potentially, observable. First, lesson-drawing occurs in response to a
concrete functional problem to which (institutional) solutions are sought,
whereas normative emulation forms a reaction to situations of great uncer-
tainty about means–ends relationships and ambiguous goals (DiMaggio and
Powell 1991). Second, lesson-drawing leads us to expect a process of
thorough evaluation concerning the lessons that can be learned from the
respective EU model, observable for example by the organisation of expert
consultations or the commissioning of scientific studies; normative emula-
tion, on the other hand, usually occurs in the absence of such assessment.
Third, lesson-drawing ought to lead to functional equivalents of EU models
given the diversity in political and institutional contexts in the EU and
elsewhere (see Kahler and Lake 2009), whereas normative emulation should
lead to the prevalence of wholesale copies (Strang and Meyer 1993: 500). To
the extent that we do see adaptations, variation between formal EU models
on the one side, and those in Mercosur and SADC on the other reflects
differences in institutional and political contexts (e.g. democracy, statehood
etc.) for lesson-drawing and divergences in normative convictions (e.g.
attitudes about sovereignty) in the case of normative emulation. The
analytical argument is depicted in Figure 1.
Market-Building Objectives: Emulating Europe’s Common Market Model
Economic cooperation approaches in Southern Africa and South America
throughout the 1980s were gradual and selective, strongly conditioned by
the inward-oriented development models (import substitution) that had
dominated in the two regions for decades, before shifting towards ambitious
EC-style common market objectives in the early 1990s. The reasons for this






































step-change in economic cooperation are manifold, closely related to
changes in material incentives that policy-makers faced at the time (for an
overview, see Mansfield and Milner 1999). However, while these commonly
cited material incentives – increasing economic interdependence, stalemate
of the Uruguay Round, increasing hegemony of the Washington Consensus,
democratisation etc. – might be sufficient to account for the general move
towards trade liberalisation strategies at the time, they are indeterminate as
to the exact direction this shift would take. In other words, why did policy-
makers adopt an EC-type common market objective rather than a ‘simpler’
NAFTA-type Free Trade Agreement (FTA)? I argue that these decisions
constitute an attempt to emulate the EC’s successful market integration
model in order to ensure the continued viability of the respective
community-building projects in a situation in which they had come seriously
under threat by various changes in the external environment.
Mercosur
Decisive moves towards market liberalisation started in 1989 with the
election of two neoliberal-minded presidents, Carlos Menem in Argentina
and Fernando Collor in Brazil, who radically liberalised their economies
unilaterally. They had been swept into power by the foreign debt crisis,
which reached its height in the late 1980s and generated major economic
instability. Trade in capital goods – the ‘demonstration’ sector of the 1986
Economic Cooperation and Integration Programme – dropped by about 20
per cent between 1980 and 1988, while debt and inflation rose enormously
(Manzetti 1993: 104). This crisis triggered great uncertainty regarding the
future of regional cooperation and robbed the previous selective and
gradual approaches of much of their meaning. Moreover, the US’s
FIGURE 1
REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND SPURRED EMULATION








































announcement in June 1990 of an Enterprise Initiative for the Americas,
intended to liberalise hemispheric trade and review debt obligations,
threatened to dilute or make superfluous the incipient integration process
between Brazil and Argentina (Wrobel 1998: 556). Continued unilateral
liberalisation, embedded in wider hemispheric liberalisation to enhance the
credibility of commitments, seemed to constitute an economically ‘rational’
response to the situation, in line with the presidents’ neoliberal economic
policy preferences.
However, just one month after the US’s announcement, they decided to
form an EC-style common market, thereby subjecting narrowly commercial
considerations to the broader quest for ‘survival’. They saw the regional
‘community-building process’ as an important end in itself given the
countries’ historic rivalries (see Menem 1996). In this context, adopting the
EC common market model not only appeared a solid economic choice,
given that policy-makers perceived the EC amidst its aspiration to complete
the Internal Market by 1992 as ‘stronger and more radiant than ever, and
much less dependent on the outside world’ (cited in Vasconcelos 2007: 167).
But because of their wider community-building ambition, the EC common
market model also seemed more appealing than its institutional alternative,
as a former Argentinean policy-maker formulates: ‘there was a predominant
sense of identification with the EU ‘‘community’’ approach to economic
integration, as opposed to the more ‘‘market-oriented’’ models of NAFTA
and the FTAA [Free Trade Area of the Americas]’ (Bouzas 2003: 15–16).
Thus, the Treaty of Asunción, which established Mercosur on 26 March
1991, uses clear EC terminology to describe the new objective, speaking of
the ‘free circulation of goods, services and factors of production’ by pursuing
the ‘elimination of customs rights and non-tariff barriers’, the establishment
of a common external tariff and the ‘adoption of a common commercial
policy’ as well as the ‘coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies’
(Art. 1). The list of common policies to be coordinated under the Treaty
reads as if it were taken from the Single European Act adopted only a few
years earlier. Moreover, the Treaty envisaged the process to follow the
classical steps of the EC model: start with the lowering of tariffs and the
elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade, then establish a customs union and
finally ensure the free circulation of other production factors to create a
common market. Policy-makers directly involved in the negotiations, such as
former Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia, clearly recall that
‘reference to the EU was constant’ in the negotiations (Interview, 29 May
2009). Several interview partners similarly suggested that there was a general
ambition to replicate Europe’s successful economic integration process.
However, this decision was hardly based on a thorough calculation of
costs and benefits. The Asunción Treaty’s ambition to complete the
common market within four years attests to a clear lack of serious
assessment of what such a process entails. Policy-makers themselves, who
have strong incentives to over-report their efforts, even admit: ‘If we go to






































the documents or to the minutes of the discussions between Brazil and
Argentina, nowhere can you find a very detailed study concerning the
technicalities of a customs union or a common market. You just have
political enthusiasm’ (Interview with Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Brazilian
diplomat, 3 June 2009).
Once the Treaty had been adopted and Mercosur representatives were
eager to seek recognition and support from Brussels, active EU support was
quickly forthcoming. The Council held its first informal ministerial meeting
in 1992, and by 1995 the Commission had initiated various cooperation
projects worth e24 million aimed primarily at supporting Mercosur’s
institutionalisation (for a complete list, see Botto 2009: 185–6). Moreover, it
trained officials and built epistemic networks, versed in EU ways of doing
things, through the establishment of a Training Centre for Regional
Integration (CEFIR) in Montevideo, Uruguay, and the Institute for
European–Latin American Relations in Madrid. This support was crucial
in retaining initial commitments. In the run-up to the adoption of the Ouro
Preto Protocol in 1994 and the establishment of a common tariff at the end
of 1995, various powerful actors in both countries, such as influential
Brazilian ambassador Nogueira Batista and Argentina’s Minister of the
Economy Domingo Cavallo, advocated abandoning the customs union and
common market commitments to be able to negotiate FTAs with important
external partners, especially the US. They mobilised in favour of a ‘shallow
integration paradigm’ that would not include the harmonisation of policies
and a common external tariff. However, the EU’s technical support, its
creation of epistemic networks and the promised negotiation of a trade
agreement with Mercosur as a bloc rather than individually contributed in
important ways to maintaining previous commitments (see Botto 2009).
SADC
Similar to South America, countries in Southern Africa were also affected
by the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s, which led to a sweep of economic
liberalisation through the conditionality programmes of international
financial institutions. While the general costs of domestic liberalisation
had thus decreased significantly in most countries by the end of the decade,
economic adjustment programmes threw great uncertainty on the continued
viability of the regional cooperation process as the organisation’s
Programme of Action bound major resources and therefore threatened to
enhance countries’ difficulties to serve their debt obligations (SADCC
Council of Ministers, 22 July 1987, Vol 1: 67). Moreover, the end of the
Cold War meant additional uncertainty regarding the continued willingness
of foreign donors to provide essential resources to an organisation, which
depended for up to 90 per cent of its budget on external funding, yet had lost
its geostrategic importance (see Adelmann 2008: 7; SADCC Council of







































steps towards regional economic integration were necessary to counter
Africa’s marginalisation in view of the decisive moves towards regionalism
in other parts of the world. However, both a NAFTA-style FTA model as
well as an EC-style common market model were deemed compatible with
these ambitions (SADCC Council of Ministers, 28 August 1991: 361).3
Without any debate in the region on the advantages and disadvantages
of each arrangement,4 an EC-style common market model soon started to
be favoured by most heads of state, with the 1991 Council concluding that
the new framework must provide ‘for cross-border investment, trade and
labour and capital flow across national boundaries’ (SADCC Council of
Ministers, 28 August 1991: 16). The Windhoek Treaty, adopted at the
Summit in August 1992, subsequently codified the new objective of
establishing an Economic Community – using EC terminology – through
‘the progressive elimination of obstacles of the free movement of capital
and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples of the region generally’
and by harmonising ‘political and socio-economic policies’ (Art. 5[2]). The
list of coordinated policies under the Treaty also contains most of the
policies the EC’s Treaty of Rome also foresaw. It thus appears to be an
instance of emulation. I found little evidence to suggest that active EU
diffusion efforts were causal for this decision; despite the fact that an
interview partner mentioned that an EC-paid European lawyer assisted in
drafting the Treaty (Interview with Stephen Kokerai, former legal advisor
to Zimbabwean government, 9 November 2009). However, the diffusion
story does not end here.
As a result of this increasing ambition and the accession of South Africa,
the EU strengthened relations with SADC in 1994 (Holland 1995). Yet little
progress was made in actually implementing market liberalisation measures.
Fearing decisive market opening, member states continued with the previous
practice of coordinating sectoral policies through the negotiation of proto-
cols, as an emulation account would expect. The EU and other international
cooperation partners, who had increasingly placed their hopes on the orga-
nisation, thus started to voice their dissatisfaction with the lack of progress.
As early as 1993, the SADC Secretariat expressed its fear that ‘SADC is
losing credibility, and risks losing the support of cooperating partners’
(SADC Council of Ministers 2 September 1993, Vol. 1: 39). This externally
induced legitimacy crisis of the organisation continued as progress remained
slow. The Dutch entirely abandoned their support in 1998 and in that year
the Consultative Conference, hitherto ‘the most important event in the
SADC’s calendar of activities’ (Sidaway 1998: 564), did not take place for the
first time. At the same time, the organisation was confronted with rumours
that the EU, its most important benefactor, would restructure its cooperation
with Africa and possibly abandon its Regional Indicative Programme (SADC
Council of Ministers, 4–5 August 2000: 82) – just as consultations on the new
programme were about to start. Given that external donors still provide
almost 60 per cent of SADC’s budget (SADC Executive Secretary 2006), this






































legitimacy crisis, which reached its peak towards the end of the decade, by then
commanded decisive action to improve SADC’s performance.
In response, policy-makers quickly engaged in a fundamental restructur-
ing of SADC institutions, which also entailed a more precise and detailed
roadmap on how to achieve the common market objective. This led to
further diffusion from the EU. Even though the EU never made continued
funding conditional upon the adoption of further EU-type institutional
change, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP),
adopted in 2003, essentially emulates the Community’s Maastricht Treaty.
It details the move from a FTA via a customs union towards a common
market, a monetary union and finally the adoption of a common currency
(SADC Summit, 25–26 August 2003: 5). The transport chapter, for example,
plans to ‘liberalize regional transport markets’ and ‘harmonize transport
rules, standards and policies’ as well as to remove ‘avoidable hindrances and
impediments to the cross border movement of persons, goods and services’ –
similar in wording and spirit to EU policy integration.
Not only did the EU thus provide the incentives to act at that particular
moment in time, it also spurred emulation regarding the content of resulting
policy changes. European donor agencies largely funded the RISDP’s
elaboration and European consultants were involved in the process
throughout. Their exact role, and thus the underlying causal mechanism,
is open to debate, though. The head of the regional expert team, which
drafted the document, claims to have written the main proposal based on
what he describes as the ‘classic model’ of economic integration (Interview
with Angelo Mandlane, 13 November 2009). Another interviewee deeply
involved with regional affairs recalled ‘a senior SADC official once telling
me that the RISDP was written by European consultants and they basically
just took the Maastricht Treaty and adapted it and put it in the language of
the region’ (Interview, 27 November 2009). The causal mechanism might
thus be either emulation or persuasion/socialisation in this particular
instance, yet the overall outcome was in any case strongly conditioned by
the broader material dependence of SADC on the EU.
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: Emulation from the European Court
of Justice
These new market-building objectives then required DSMs to ensure their
credibility. As members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and later WTO, the adoption of the multilateral DSM in the
regional context was a perfectly rational response to this functional
requirement (Alter 2012). Yet governments in both regions have since the
early 1990s gradually strengthened their DSMs beyond the multilateral
baseline, emulating (elements of) the ECJ model, despite their concerns
about the delegation of sovereignty. Why? I argue that EU influence played







































credibility with the EU and other international cooperation partners, whose
continued material support to the broader project seemed to be in danger at
various points during the 1990s; whereas in Mercosur they reflect the
increasing traction of demands for the establishment of an ECJ-style court
advanced by a variety of regional actors in a context of increasing attempts
to revive the integration process in the wake of a major economic crisis. I
will speak of an ECJ-style DSM when we see two main features: a
preliminary rulings procedure that enables national courts to ask the court
for opinions on community-related rulings and an administrative and
constitutional review authority that allows not just states, but community
organs and private litigants to challenge community acts in front of the
court (Alter 2012).
SADC Tribunal
Discussions on a new dispute settlement mechanism for SADC began in the
early 1990s in light of the newly envisioned integration agenda discussed in
the previous section. In 1991, an expert team made recommendations on a
revised institutional structure arguing that its institutions ‘are adequate and
effective generally’, mentioning only in a side note (not in the list of
institutions to be officially included in the new Treaty) that ‘settlement of
disputes shall be by arbitration’ (cited in SADCC Council of Ministers, 28
August 1991: 379). This proposal thus suggested an intergovernmental
GATT-type DSM, thereby reflecting member states’ reluctance to delegate
sovereignty. Even the theme document for the 1992 Consultative
Conference, which for the first time seriously engaged justifications for
different approaches to economic integration in the region, was largely silent
on the issue. It merely noted that a regional development community
requires ‘mechanisms of mediation and arbitration, to which all agents of
integration – governments, business, civil associations and individuals – can
seek justice’ (SADCC 1992: 41–2). Hence, when the decision was taken to
establish a Tribunal with the Windhoek Treaty, no real discussion on the
costs and benefits of different options had taken place at the regional level.
However, this decision was taken in a particular context marked by
uncertainty regarding the continued commitment of external partners to the
organisation. Around the same time, it became increasingly clear that the
geopolitical changes of the Cold War, especially the rapid turn of Eastern
European countries to market capitalism, would mean increasing competi-
tion over scarce resources supplied mainly by Northern industrialised
countries. The 1991 Summit shared the Secretariat’s fear, for example, that
‘the existing patterns of net resource flows are likely to, at best, stay the
same in real terms, in the face of keen competition for aid and investment
from the other parts of the world, notably Eastern Europe’ (SADCC
Summit, 26 August 1991: 7). Given SADC’s dependence on both aid and
investment from the EU and other regions, these fears quickly elevated






































investment market integration and the mobilisation of own resources for the
operation of SADC to the top of the regional agenda (SADCC Council of
Ministers, 14 August 1992: 2–3). This was also against the background that
the main impact of the envisaged common market was to be expected in
stimulating ‘new types of investment’ rather than increasing intra-regional
trade (SADCC Council of Ministers, 27 January 1992: 2).
This context of external dependence constrained policy-makers’ choices. It
was paramount for them to retain the credibility and legitimacy with external
aid and investment partners and signal to them that the new integration effort
justified their continued support. One of the ways to do this is to draw on the
credibility of established models, especially those favoured by external
partners, by ‘visibly’ emulating (some of) its central features, while retaining
a more sovereignty-preserving institution ‘in practice’. This is what the Tri-
bunal stipulation in theWindhoekTreaty did. It envisaged the establishment of
a permanent Tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction and the power to ‘give
advisory opinions’ over all matters of the Treaty and subsidiary instruments
(Art. 16); yet member states were clear internally that it was to be among ‘the
central intergovernmental organs of the community’ (SADCC Council of
Ministers, 14 August 1992: 35, emphasis added). Given the vagueness of the
stipulation, it was left for further elaboration in a separate protocol.
With South Africa’s accession to SADC in 1994, the issue of sovereignty
came to the fore again (Schoeman n.d.: 8). As by far the largest member of
the organisation, it shared other members’ protective attitude concerning
national sovereignty and had concerns that the Tribunal would challenge its
strong Constitutional Court – concerns that were eventually overcome in
principle. Nevertheless, when member states started work on the Tribunal
Protocol in 1997, sovereignty concerns and the lack of direct effect of Treaty
stipulations strongly pointed towards the adoption of the new WTO-type
DSM in the regional context, which was fully compatible with original
Treaty stipulations, including the mention of ‘advisory opinions’. However,
as we have seen before, SADC’s international cooperation partners had
grown increasingly dissatisfied with its performance and voiced that
dissatisfaction openly. In this general context of uncertainty, they posited
particular doubts about the ability to improve the record of the organisation
without an enhanced dispute settlement mechanism that could push member
states to abide by their commitments (see SADC Council of Ministers, 10–
11 August 1999: 110). Once again, there is no evidence that EU actors (or
others) ever explicitly connected continued funding with a particular type of
DSM. However, on various occasions, EU-oriented actors conveyed their
views about ‘what an effective and credible dispute settlement mechanism
ought to entail’, as one of my interview partners recounted of an EC-
financed British judge who formed part of the expert group drafting the
Protocol (Interview with Stephen Kokerai). Moreover, the prospect of
international donors contributing to the financing of the new institution







































In an attempt to ensure credibility towards the outside amidst serious
legitimacy constraints, designers thus adopted the central ECJ features, but
mitigated its potential intrusiveness – a pattern that once again follows an
emulation logic. On the one side, the Tribunal Protocol, adopted in 2000,
features exclusive competence to constitutional review (Art. 17), private
access (Art. 15, 18) and a preliminary rulings procedure (Art. 16), which is a
literal copy of Art. 177 of the Treaty of Rome. It even goes beyond the
ECJ’s competences by stipulating that non-compliance suits can be brought
directly by individuals when all other domestic remedies have been
exhausted (Art. 15b) and by explicitly providing for the development of
‘Community jurisprudence’ (Art. 21b) (for a good overview, see Ruppel and
Bangamwabo 2008). On the other hand, policy-makers carefully circum-
scribed the Tribunal’s competences. The protocol thus stipulates that
sanctions in case of non-compliance with a ruling could only be imposed by
the Summit, acting as always by unanimity. Moreover, in the absence of a
direct effect doctrine and a preliminary rulings procedure that does not
require national courts of last instance to refer cases to the Tribunal, as in
the EU, private access and even preliminary rulings are much less likely to
be sovereignty-encroaching. As long as member states do not incorporate
rules into their domestic legal corpus, they do not constitute claimable rights
among citizens. Given the notoriously low compliance rates in SADC, these
features may well turn out to be a ‘toothless tiger’, at least in enforcing
economic integration commitments (see Frimpong Oppong 2008).6
Mercosur Court of Justice
Unlike the SADC Tribunal, the evolution of Mercosur’s DSM has been
much more gradual with a significant strengthening of institutionalisation
over time and in a context in which material dependence on the EU is largely
absent. Mercosur’s first dispute settlement mechanism, adopted in 1991 with
the Protocol of Brası́lia, was purely intergovernmental and designed along
GATT lines. It was barely used as member states preferred to deal with
disputes directly through bilateral negotiations. Towards the end of the
decade, however, the dispute settlement system drew increasing criticism
from academics as well as civil society actors in the region. The problem lay
less in its inability to settle disputes between member states, of which there
were few; it had more to do with its failure to ensure compliance with
Mercosur legislation and reflected a broader dissatisfaction with the
continued tight political control of the Mercosur integration process and
the lack of strong regional institutions. In this context, the creation of an
ECJ-style Mercosur Court of Justice was seen by many as ‘sorely needed’
(see de Araujo 2001: 35) and an ‘indispensable guarantee for a community
of states based on the principles of economic inequality and legal equality’,
as Uruguay’s Foreign Minister Didier Oppertti formulated (cited in
Pimentel 2004: 148) – a position that Uruguay, increasingly supported by






































Paraguay, had been taking since the beginning of the integration process.
These calls were increasingly supported by an influential advocacy coalition,
consisting of high-profile legal experts, who had on various occasions
occupied positions in Mercosur institutions and even national governments,
such as Alejandro Perotti or Deisy Ventura. Many of them had studied in
Europe and/or written doctorates on the European legal system and its
applicability to Mercosur (see Perotti 2004).
In the wake of the Brazilian/Argentinean financial and economic crisis,
which hit the region harshly in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the entire
integration process plunged into crisis. Conflicts between member states
over the application of Mercosur rules started to proliferate as Argentina
sought protection from cheap Brazilian imports by erecting barriers to the
free flow of goods, threatening to unravel the entire project (Gomez Mera
2005). This opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for these demands to be
increasingly attended to. Even though member states continued to deal
with the fallout of the crisis quite effectively through ‘presidential
diplomacy’ rather than recourse to the Adjudication Tribunal (Malamud
2003), they nevertheless decided to strengthen it with the 2002 Olivos
Protocol, which established a Permanent Review Tribunal modelled on the
WTO. However, further piecemeal reform subsequently even went beyond
the WTO arrangement in addressing these demands. Elaborating the
provision on ‘consultative opinions’ in the Protocol (Art. 3) in Decisions
CMC/37/03 and CMC/02/07, member states emulated the wording of Art.
177 of the Treaty of Rome, yet they protected national sovereignty by
making them non-binding and allowing neither lower-level national courts
(they have to act through their national Supreme Courts) nor the
Mercosur Secretariat to request such opinions. The DSM thereby largely
continues to lack the embeddedness that characterises the ECJ (Alter
2012).
However, the aforementioned crisis eventually brought to power new
governments in most Mercosur countries, among which the election of Lula
da Silva in Brazil in 2002 was the most consequential for this process. He
announced that he would seek to ‘relaunch’ the integration process inter alia
by strengthening Mercosur institutions. Before his election, one of his
foreign policy advisors had already declared that Mercosur’s future would
have to entail the creation of supranational institutions along EU lines.
Shortly thereafter, member states began discussions on a complete revision
of Mercosur’s institutions 10 years after the Ouro Preto Protocol. In these
negotiations, Uruguay once again tabled a proposal for the establishment of
an ECJ-style Mercosur Court of Justice (Interview with Elbio Rosselli,
Former Director of Mercosur at Uruguay’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9
July 2009). Nevertheless, the larger member states rejected these demands
due to concerns about national sovereignty (Interview with Reinaldo
Salgado, Director of Mercosur Division at Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign







































ECJ-type court has firmly constituted the cornerstone of the debate on legal
integration in Mercosur up to the highest governmental levels.
The coalition voicing this demand has since continued to expand and has
sought to hold Brazil to its general willingness to consider supranational
institutions. This has set in motion a process that seems to be at the brink of
overcoming remaining resistance to the establishment of such an institution
in the Brazilian government. The aforementioned advocacy coalition has
stepped up its activities through a series of events where institutional reform
is discussed and policy-makers confronted with ‘basic elements for the
constitution of a Mercosur Court of Justice’ (Perotti 2009). It increasingly
joins forces with other powerful actors and Mercosur’s own institutions.
The Supreme Courts in Mercosur, organised in an epistemic network,
announced their general openness to the possible creation of a Mercosur
court (see Perotti 2009: fn. 1), while the Permanent Review Tribunal
regularly cites ECJ rulings in its own judgments, indicating their clear
relevance to the Mercosur integration process. The newly created Mercosur
Parliament has also been advocating its creation in the so-called ‘political
declaration’. In October 2010, the member states, including Brazil and
Argentina, endorsed this declaration by Decision CMC/28/10, thereby
committing, in principle, to the establishment of a supranational Mercosur
Court of Justice.
Conclusion
Focusing on market-building objectives and regional courts, this article has
analysed the diffusion of EU institutional models to Mercosur and SADC at
various critical junctures of regional institutional evolution. In accounting
for the puzzle that policy-makers have, over time, increasingly opted for
EU-type rather than NAFTA- or WTO-type institutional arrangements,
which appear more suitable to their overall preferences for ‘pragmatic’ and
sovereignty-preserving cooperation, I offered an explanation of the dynamic
process of EU influence – termed ‘spurred emulation’ – that is rather
different from functional explanations of economic regionalism and regional
institutional change.
I highlighted two main factors that condition diffusion from the EU. The
first one is a functional demand for institutional change emanating from a
serious regional crisis, which unsettles previous preferences and leads to
decision-making under conditions of high uncertainty (see also Jetschke and
Murray 2012). As policy-makers struggle to ensure the ‘survival’ of their
regional grouping, this decision-making context opens a ‘window of
opportunity’ for diffusion to occur and renders emulation rather than
lesson-drawing (or competition) the more likely mechanism. While these
windows of opportunity were associated mainly with dynamics unrelated to
the EU in the case of Mercosur, uncertainty about continued EU funding
propelled action on various occasions in SADC. The latter’s high degree of






































material dependence on EU support, a form of power asymmetry, has thus
been an important source of diffusion dynamics. However, material support
is never conditional upon the adoption of EU institutional arrangements.
The second factor emphasises the importance of domestic politics. A
window of opportunity is only likely to lead to the actual diffusion of EU
institutional models when domestic actors actively spur such diffusion. The
very success of European integration, as well as direct EU support,
empowers these actors in calling for EU-style institutional change. For
Mercosur, the story is mainly about the empowerment of domestic advocacy
coalitions and epistemic communities, including the two smaller member
states and regional institutions, whereas in SADC it has to do more with the
influence of EU-oriented (and often EU-paid) consultants. While state
capacity and regime character also play a role in conditioning EU diffusion
processes, they seem less critical to understanding the broad dynamics of
EU influence on regional institutional change that this article focuses on.
Finally, it has to be noted that this article has focused mainly on broad
similarities between Mercosur and SADC attributable to the dynamics
associated with diffusion processes from the EU. However, it is important to
note that important differences remain between the two regions and that the
diffusion of EU institutional templates is ‘incomplete’ to the extent that it
has seldom led to their wholesale copying or to the adoption of EU practices
or behaviour. Instead, EU models have regularly been unpicked and
adapted to fit with policy-makers’ normative convictions, especially their
continued concerns about national sovereignty. It thus remains a formidable
challenge to account more systematically for such variation in EU diffusion
processes and its effects on subsequent practices.
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Notes
1. The discussion of the Mercosur Court of Justice is still somewhat speculative, as the court’s
establishment has only been agreed ‘in principle’, but no concrete steps have been taken in
this direction.
2. However, these scope conditions lead to indeterminate expectations regarding the likelihood
of diffusion from the EU across the two cases as they cut in opposite directions. We would
expect weaker state capacity and a higher democratic quality of regimes to be associated with







































likely to resonate. While state capacity is weaker, on average, in SADC than in Mercosur,
the democratic quality is, on average, higher in the latter.
3. Both models were also deemed compatible with the pan-African ambition to form an African
Economic Community (see SADCC Council of Ministers, 22–23 August 1991: 33–5).
4. SADC records at the time mention no single study conducted to weigh the costs and benefits
of the two potential options.
5. See http://www.sadc.int/tribunal/organisation.php (accessed 14 June 2011).
6. However, in the area of human rights a 2008 Tribunal ruling on Zimbabwean President
Mugabe’s land reform (Campbell case) has sparked huge controversy and triggered a debate
about curtailing the Tribunal’s mandate; see http://www.zimbabwedemocracynow.com/
2011/05/26/sadc-tribunal-rights-watch-statement/ (accessed 14 June 2011).
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